Diversity in nature

Why are things in nature more ‘different’ than ‘same’? Why is ‘difference’ the norm and similarity the exception, as against otherwise?

An intuitive Mathematical explanation – Arithmetic and Geometry.

Arithmetic – Consider 2 bags, each full of numbers – the same numbers (say, 1 to 1000). Pick up a number from the first and one from the second bag. There is more probability of they being UNEQUAL, than they being THE SAME. The chance of picking up a ‘47’ from the second bag too, after picking up a ‘47’ from the first bag is very very less. Inequality can happen in many ways; equality in only one special case. Thus there is more chance for inequality to happen.

OR

Geometry – 

Consider a vertical line as shown above. Draw curves on both the sides such that the line is a tangent to the curves. Keep drawing one curve on the left and one on the right, as shown. The chance of them coinciding / being the same is very less. They will be distinct like as seen in the above figure. Only when the radius of curvature of both the curves is infinite (when the curve coincides with the vertical lines) will the curves coincide and be the same. That’s the special case. Difference is the norm, sameness the exception. 

Memory as a substitute for thinking

Memory can be a substitute for thinking in one obvious way – you know (remember) the answer instead of having to think about it. 

But this substitution can happen in more ways than the above. 

Consider this problem – Today is a Sunday. Every Sunday, there is a conference call of your organisation. Suppose today you are told that you have to make a presentation one month from now. Then how many Sunday’s later is that resentation going to be? 

You can think. Something like say – One month period is 4 weeks i.e. 4 ‘week-intervals’. So (it strikes you) that there should be 5 Sundays, from the beginning of the one month period, uptill the end of the one month period. So counting today as the first Sunday, the 5th Sunday (since that signals the end of the one month period from today) is the presentation Sunday. So (5-1) i.e. 4 Sundays later, is the presentation day.

Now, you could have avoided the thinking, by mechanically writing down on a paper, say, vertical line markings for a Sunday, one after another, and labelling every new line as an ordered Sunday (1st, 2nd etc.) and kept an eye on when 4 ‘week intervals’ (gaps between 2 consecutive vertical lines) get over. That Sunday (its ordered number) is the presentation day.

Here, in the second method, thinking has been substituted by something mechanical. But what have you done by writing all this on the paper? You have unloaded the burden off your memory – having to remember and keep track of where you are in the process – since you are “seeing the status” of things as you are bringing them to mind. So basically, you have used (nothing but) memory, by writing all that on the paper, that approach!

This is how memory has played an actual, literal substitute for thinking (in the guise of a mechanical, literal method of solving the problem). 

Commonsense – only Logic and Precedence?

Question : Is there any commonsensical inference which is not on the basis of LOGIC or PRECEDENCE bases?

By PRECEDENCE, it is meant, things like – “Has this been seen or experienced before anywhere in the world? How many such cases would be there? …..etc.

And LOGIC includes Scientific logic like say gravity, electrostatic attraction/repulsion etc. 

Consider this data – John is in the living room.

COMMONSENSE INFERENCES – 

  1. There is a living room somewhere – with its components – a floor (this is implied by LOGIC – gravity), furniture (PRECEDENCE – how many living rooms have you seen without furniture?), ceiling (PRECEDENCE – how many rooms have you seen without a ceiling?), walls (LOGIC – by definition of a room).
  2. There exists a person called John. LOGIC. 
  3. There is a house somewhere with the living room, with other room(s). PRECEDENCE; depends upon what you can call a living room.
  4. Planet earth exists – LOGIC – “planet earth existing” is a symbolic statement for there not being nothing i.e. everything (the planet) collapsed/in disorder.
  5. There is a certain date and time at that instance –  LOGIC.
  6. John is  smaller than the living room / there is space in the living room for John. Both  LOGIC + CONCEIVABILITY PRECEDENCE. No one has been able to conceive “A inside B and yet A bigger than B”. 
  7. Most of John’s body parts are in the living room. STATISTICAL PRECEDENCE. How many such people exist? (that too in houses).
  8. Someone built the house (living room). LOGIC SAYS NOT NECESSARY – it could be one of the solutions of the random natural processes. BUT NO PRECEDENCE of auto-building through natural process.
  9. John existed all the while from his birth till that point in time. SCIENTIFIC LOGIC / PRECEDENCE – Once a person dies, he cannot become alive again. 
  10. John has a father and a mother. SCIENTIFIC LOGIC / PRECEDENCE.
  11. Someone owns the house LOGIC SAYS NOT NECESSARY (might be a haunted structure somewhere, no one went near to). BUT AGAIN HAS PRECEDENCE ARGUMENT – how many houses (or material things) exist which are not owned by anyone? (This point I am not sure of, in the sense – perhaps, even logically necessary).
  12. John is below the clouds. PRECEDENCE – No structure has been built which reaches upto the clouds. . 

There are also some things which are NOT TRUE – 

1. John is not in the kitchen. PRECEDENCE. Both – the living room and kitchen can be the same, logically speaking.

2. John is not outside the house.  PRECEDENCE (living room outside the house). Or LOGIC if a living room, by definition has to be inside the house.

3. John is not having a bath. PRECEDENCE.

4. John isn’t cooking food. PRECEDENCE.

5. John is not in a vehicle. LOGICALLY NOT NECESSARY. BUT AGAIN PRECEDENCE – Vehicle inside a living room. How many cases have you seen of a vehicle being inside a living room?

Commonsense definitions

A small point – 
Consider this sentence – The lawyer is talking. 
Immediately this conjures up an image in the mind of a lawyer in a courtroom wearing a lawyer’s dress and arguing.

But this could also mean that a man is talking in his sleep, and is a lawyer by profession. Things would still mean – “The lawyer is talking”. But we dont visualise that. Why?

Because : have a look at the very definitions of words in a dictionary. How does a dictionary describe definitions of words – we have phrases like “when someone…”, “when something…”, “when one…..”, “(word) relating to…”, “(word) used to indicate….”, “used to mean….” etc. But what’s hidden behind this ‘relating to’ and ‘used to indicate’ and ‘used to mean’? What’s hidden is ‘USUALLY’! ‘In typical/normal scenarios!’ Even the phrases “when someone”, “when something is so and so way it is called…..” have the implicit connotation of “usually”, “in typical scenarios”, “in regular cases” etc. And what does all that – the hidden stuff and the implicit connotations indicate – Commonsense! Meaning commonly, usually, typically, in normal scenarios….etc.


So, if the very definitions of the words in the dictionary are “commonsense definitions”, the visuals of the sentences too have to be commonsensical and typical. 

Speaking the other way, even my phone can be named as ‘lawyer’! If such possibilities are to be accommodated, the whole dictionary would turn wild !

Emotional Thinking

There is nothing like ‘thinking versus emotion’. There is thinking and there is emotional thinking. Thinking, rawly, is connectionism. You connect 2 pieces of data in a certain way to arrive at a thought – a product of intellect. But so do you connect 2 “emotional elements” in certain ways reminiscent of connectionism (as is present in thinking) to arrive at an emotional thought. Suppose you love your 2 sisters – Mary and Jane. You think – when’s my love Mary going to come to meet me here? I haven’t seen Jane for a long long time. How I wish I could talk to Jane! Then there can be a ‘THOUGHT’ – an emotional thought – like what if both of them came here? And you feel immense happiness at that imagination. Here you have connected 2 emotional elements – your attachment to Mary and your attachment to Jane, with a connectionist element of “COMBINATION”. You have combined / added the 2. This is thinking in the emotional realm. Lets see this in more detail.


All emotions are associated with a want, a desire. Take say feeling emotional about seeing your favourite batsman walk off the ground in his last match. Here there is a want of seeing him bat. Or something like – oh, what a cute puppy! Here you want to hold the puppy close to you. Emotions are thus networks of such wants. Suppose someone narrates to you the sacrifices of the freedom fighters of your country and you get emotional. There is firstly a want of those fighters for freedom for the freedom; there is your want of not seeing such good people not suffer; there is a realisation of their want for the fulfillment of your want of freedom. This is an example of a set of connected wants in the emotionality of the whole issue. 


Now, lets see what these wants are connected by; what the connectionist elements are. Emotions are said to not support high-level thinking and allow only for “dumb”, low-level elementary thinking. Lets not get into that debate. (Higher level intellectual feats are achieved consciously by “controlling oneself” and “maintaining calm”. Even if you are intensely charged up and motivated, you cannot let all that spill over into the actual process of the execution of the intellectual act or the mental skill). This feature of emotions allowing for only shallow thinking is seen in the nature of the connectionism in their case of thinking – these are essentially simple conceptual antonym pairs (and in the obvious sense of amount of distinction i.e. high and low) like – distant/close, get/not get, create/destroy, more/less, add/subtract, present/absent, win/lose etc. In the case of the 3rd want of the freedom fighters’ example, the connectionist element is a comparison of the amounts of ‘distant’ and ‘close’ – “they (freedom fighters) were so disconnected and thus “far” from me/us (present generation) and yet they have a want for fulfilling my wants (something like closeness)!” Or suppose your son goes to school and you get the thought owing to your love and care for him – what if other students eat up his tiffin? Here the 2 emotions are – your love for your son and son’s want of tiffin. The connectionst element involved – the speculation of someone eating up his tiffin – is a simple case of ‘CREATE/DESTROY’ (others finishing his food) or ‘GET/NOT GET’ (he getting the food or not)!


Take another example. Suppose your beloved batsman is playing his last match. Also, you have a huge passion for making your son a cricketer. You take him to the match. The batsman gets out and is walking off for the last time. You are obviously in tears for that one particular emotion. But then there can be an emotional thought – why don’t I lift my son (whom I badly want to become a cricketer) in my arms and show him this great cricketer which his growing generation will never see again. The 2 emotions (beloved batsman + want of making your son a cricketer) have been connected by the elementary connectionist concept of ‘ADD’ (see the listed examples above). You have added one to the other. 


‘Wants’ bound by ‘simple connectionism of elementary concepts’ is the ‘network’ of ’emotional thinking’.
(Each of the terms in quotes have been talked about above). 

Variedness of the mind

Why don’t we sit on the chair (for typing on the computer on the desk), in exactly the same fashion everyday? Why don’t we wear our same-sized T-shirt in exactly the same fashion every morning? Why dont 2 soccer matches between 2 teams with each having the same players on the 2 occasions, and played on identical grounds yield the same result? 

Suppose your friend is sitting besides you. You poke his shoulder with your finger. He will say “ouch! What?” You do this again. He will be irritated again, but react differently – not exactly alike. But when I click on my File tab in Microsoft Word, everytime, the same menu will drop down; everything’s the same every time. (Here also, it is not certain that even if you do this 100 times, the 101st time, the menu will pop down. But induction takes care of that.)

Why this difference? What is the reason for this “variedness” and “diversity” every time in the case of humans? What is the reason for this fixedness in case of the ‘File tab, Microsoft Word, screen, mouse, cursor’-system and there not being so in case of your ‘friend’s mind, his body, your poking hand’-system? Both have “codes” in them. Our brain is an organised entity which reacts in certain ways to certain stimuli. A poke is like a physical force acting from the side; the reactions should be the same on both the occasions if the speed and intensity of the poke is the same and at the same place on the shoulder, on the 2 occasions. 

Two reasons : 

One difference is MEMORY / “BAGGAGE” / CONTEXT. The first poke goes in memory, influencing the way the second poke is received by the system. There is a “baggage” of the first poke. There is a context generated by the first poke, contributing to the state of your system before the reception of the second poke, making the second reaction different. There is no such memory in the File tab for the clicks.*

Also, in real life, no two situations (at 2 different instances in time) are exactly alike. So the state of the mind on any 2 occasions cannot be exactly alike since the input signals from these surroundings that are coming are different, at least slightly, everytime. So my reactions to the same thing are going to be different on different occasions.

*Now, one might say that this can be done if the machine maintains a log of the activity (btw is the maintenance of a kind of a “log” of ‘what’s happening’, consciousness?) of the clicks and “randomly” generates a slightly varied response everytime there is a click on the File tab. This would be like the friend’s different reactions on exactly similar pokes every time. But such machine randomness isn’t really randomness because, due to the code you have created for enabling that process in the machine, the machine, in concept and principle has pre-occupations on what “random” change to generate every time; it’s just that you the programmer aren’t aware of those preoccupations and have this illusion of randomness.  

There is nothing random and varied and diverse in the mind. It’s all a response based on the very initial state from which it started. Very complex to map and write down; but exists in principle definitely. 

Extending this, there is nothing random in the universe as a whole. The initial state of things has decided everything. It’s just that we cannot put down all those variables and predict things. But the predictive answer exists. Just like the initial velocity and angle of shooting decides everything for a projectile motion – the range, time of flight, maximum height etc. 

The combination of machine, mind and the world (surroundings) in the universe is behaving in this predictable fashion every second. It’s just that it is out of our human bounds to know of all of those predictions. 

Is this what they call destiny (which I hate!)? Lets see if the creation of smart machines is there in this “script”!

Physical Relativity v/s Mental Relativity

Consider 2 cars – A and B – travelling in parallel along a straight line along a straight road. A is travelling at say, 40 km/h and B at say, 20 km/h. The velocity of B relative to A is -20 km/h i.e. receding at a speed of 20 km/h parallelly along the straight line. If B was travelling at some angle with the straight line, along  a straight line, the motion of B from the reference frame of A would be some straight line at some angle with our original straight line (the road). Now, the speed of B changes with respect to A in both the cases when you step into the reference frame of A. The magnitude and direction of velocity changes but the qualitative nature of the motion remains the same – motion along a straight line. It is not say, that in the earth’s reference frame, B is travelling in a straight line and in the reference frame of A, the motion of B becomes along a curve or something – (as long as the 2 entities – A and B – are undergoing the same nature of motion).

Consider another example – Suppose there are 2 people A and B. And A gives a ball to B. From the earth-frame, A is losing possession of the ball and B is gaining possession of the ball. In the ball’s reference frame, A is going away from the ball and B is coming to take the ball. Now, the first observation in both the cases, i.e. A losing possession of the ball and A going away from the ball are qualitatively the same. And the second observations, i.e. B gaining possession of the ball and B coming to take the ball are again qualitatively the same. So, in both the above examples, the truth is preserved. The qualitative nature of the phenomenon remains the same, irrespective of changing your reference frame from one to some other, in case of a system of 2 “equivalent”-entities (2 cars travelling along a straight line (or both along a curve) or 2 human beings, with a transfer of a thing from one to another).
But now consider 2 minds – A and B. A hits B and derives pleasure from that (say, he is a boxer who enjoys punching people). From the reference frame of the MIND of A, the event is a pleasurable event, whereas say, from the reference frame of the MIND of a third person like you or me observing this, this is an annoying or a surprising event. Now the same phenomenon is enjoyable from one mental reference frame and annoying or surprising from another. These 2 observations/experiences are qualitatively different from each other. The basic nature of the phenomenon experienced changes with change of reference frame. Hence the essential qualitative truth is not preserved across mental reference frames.
This shows that physical reference frames and mental reference frames are fundamentally different. In this case, physical relativity is quantitative whereas mental relativity could be qualitative as well. Hence the very concept of a mind seems fundamentally altered from that of physicality (a physical body).

Calculus for commonsense?

What is commonsense?
Short and simple explanation : 
Suppose you have a data D. And commonsense says that it means D’. What is this D’?

Convert D into a visual medium. There will be several ways to describe the visual i.e. effectively D. Each of those descriptions will involve slightly many different words, coming from the visual “scene”. Each of those will be samples of D’!

This is different from “just another way to say the same thing” and is actually a case of “data meaning something”, and is supported by a cognitive processing step in between – namely, the ‘visualisation’. Strictly speaking, this is Commonsense Meaning (and not just ‘common sense’ in general).

Also, each of these D’s will also, strictly speaking, imply something, involving mostly the same words in that particular D’. That will keep it “close” to that D’ and related to that D’. Lets call it D”. These will be the commonsensical implications from D. (Like ‘John giving a gift to Jack (D)’ commonsensically implying that ‘Jack became happy (D”)’). 


Example : 

A is holding a ball – D.

1. A’s fingers are gripping the ball – D’.

2. A’s palm was touching encompassingly the ball – D’.(There will be many D’s).

D” of 1 is ‘A’s fingers were touching the ball’ which is a commonsense implication of D.

The above also highlights the difference between ‘meaning’ and ‘implication’ via the explanations of commonsense meaning and commonsense implication. 


Can we use Calculus to represent Common Sense implications where the fundamental conventional differential ‘dx’ is the implicative thought addendum to X, supported cognitively by the step of visualisation, which is the pathway from one linguistic description of something to another of the same thing?

Commonsense-feasibility scheme

REPRESENTATION OF THE COMMONSENSICAL FEASIBILITY (OR OTHERWISE) OF A PROPOSITION

We are encountered with statements like these in research literature on Commonsense AI – 

Televisions don’t eat ice creams.

You cannot make salad out of shirts.

You cannot eat noodles on a globe of earth.

In most data, 2 entities/concepts come together. (TVs – ice creams; salad – shirt; noodles – globe of earth.) 

Here is an algorithmic method to represent, decide & explain the acceptability or inacceptability of a phenomenon (like those above) on the basis of commonsense : 

(The method will become clearer with the 3 examples that follow it.)

Let the 2 entities be A and B.

  1. Think of the most basic definitive property of A and that of B. Let them be A1 and B1 respectively.
  1. Check if A1 is compatible with B1.

            If not, drop the issue. 

  1. If compatible, move to A2 and B2. A2 and B2 are the next most definitively basic properties that one can think about the entities A and B.

Check if A2 is compatible with B2. But that not enough; here is a point – 

A2 is not a “mathematical” evoluent of A1, or B2 is of B1. So the earlier lower levels also have to be checked with for compatibility. That is, alongwith A2-B2, A1-B2 and B1-A2 compatibilities also have to be checked.

And so on. The moment there is incompatibility, the issue drops dead and the phenomenon is unfeasible on the basis of commonsense. 

The more commonsensically invalid the phenomenon/issue will be, the earlier will it drop dead; and vice versa.

Now, let’s see this applied to 3 cases – both commonsensically feasible (the first 2) as well as otherwise (the 3rd one).

  1. TVs cannot eat ice-creams.

We have TV & ICE-CREAM as A and B.

Which is the most basic definitive property of a TV? One might say that the first thing that comes to mind is that it displays moving pictures. No, even more fundamental to that is that it’s firstly, a thing – a non-living thing. When you first see an off-TV, that’s the first thing you consume about it. 

So, A1 = non-living thing

Similarly, B1 = non-living thing

Checking the compatibility of A1 and B1 :

Can a non-living thing eat a non……..here itself there is a basic infeasibility that a non-living thing cannot eat anything. So A1-B1 is incompatible and the issue drops dead here itself. 

The very first link ‘A1-B1’ is broken and there is no solid link.

So at the very first level, there is incompatibility; hence the ridiculousness of the proposition.

  1. You cannot make salad out of shirts.

We have  A = SALAD & B = SHIRT.

THe most basic definitive property of a salad is that it’s a thing – a non-living thing. 

So, A1=non-living thing.

Similarly, B1 = non-living thing.

A non-living thing can be made out of a non-living thing. So there is compatibility between A1 and B1. 

Now, move to A2 and B2 : 

A2 = it is something edible; B2=made of cloth

Can something made of cloth be edible? NO. So A2 is not compatible with B2; and the issue drops dead here.

We might also check for A1-B2 : Can a non-living thing be made of cloth? YES.

And we might also check for B1-A2 : Can a non-living thing be edible? Depends upon what sense you take the non-livingness of the eatable as. So YES or NO depending upon that.

So, we have solid A1-B1, A1-B2 and B1-A2 links, but a broken A2-B2 one.

The issue collapses at the second stage itself; hence the ridiculousness of it.

  1. You can use a mug to carry water

A = MUG, B = carrying water

A1 = non-living thing

B1 = solid, supporting carrier

A non-living thing can be a solid, supporting carrier. So, A1 – B1 is compatible.

Lets move to A2 and B2 : 

A2 = something with space to carry

B2 = should be sufficiently rigid for carrying and not spill-worthy (tearable/too thin/loose)

Something with space to carry can be sufficiently rigid for carrying and not spill-worthy (tearable/too thin/loose). So A2-B2 is compatible.

A1-B2:

A non-living thing can be sufficiently rigid for carrying and not spill-worthy (tearable/too thin/loose)

So, A1-B2 is compatible.

B1-A2 : 

Some solid supporting carrier can have space to carry.

So, B1-A2 is compatible.

Then we move to A3-B3 :

……and so on.

So now we have A1-B1, A2-B2 as well as the cross-links A1-B2 and B1-A2, all compatible. So it’s a nice strong robust structure capable of withstanding reality. Hence it is a sensible proposition.

BASIS OF COMMONSENSICAL ABSURDITY

What is ‘wrong’? Anything that doesnt serve the purpose.

I want to open the door. If I wipe my dinner plate on the dining table near the door, the door wont open; that would be WRONG. The one property one sees as to the 2 actions – wiping the plate and turning the knob of the door – is that they are clearly DIFFERENT from each other. 2 “different” things can serve the same purpose; but in most cases if you do something completely different than the prescribed path, you will not get to the end result. (Even though ‘wrong’ implies ‘different’ and not necessarily the other way round, later we will see that the origin of the word ‘different’, in general and broadly, itself implies something that wont serve the purpose of the context and hence would be effectively something “wrong”).

Wrong and right are different from each other.  

You cannot throw an apple to the moon. There are ways to send things to the moon, and throwing an apple by hand bears a difference with all of those instances.

You cannot make salad out of shirts. There ways to make salad, and there is a difference between bringing in shirts and all of those ways.

Quite simply, something what we call ‘different’ in the very first place, is, by connotative definition, what doesn’t adhere, loosely speaking, to the ‘context’ we are in i.e. to the goal/purpose of why we are considering/doing whatever we are considering/doing at that time).

So whatever is “different” from ‘X’, won’t go where X is headed towards, or do what X is doing, or look like X, or work or behave like X…and so on. Something different than X won’t “fit into” the “world of X”. Its world won’t match with the world of X.

When there is no commonality between X and X’ or the quantum of difference between the values of the common measurable parameters of X and X’ is huge, X’ is drastically different than X. So the world of X’ is completely different from the world of X. Making a mistake in juxtaposing such worlds is extremely dumb and absence of COMMONSENSE.

For example, the world of ‘electrical/electronic circuit equipment’ and that of ‘vegetation’ qualify to be such worlds. So, one such commonsense follow-up statement from this (like those in literature on commonsense AI) is that – you cannot make cell-phone circuits out of leaves or fruits. This is a case of no commonality. In the case of a human throwing a thing with his hand to the moon, there is a huge quantum of difference in the common parameter of force that is generated by a space shuttle and the human hand. So that becomes a case of a drastically high difference in the values of the common parameter.

Similar examples of X and X’ could be : 1) Rodents and Saturn 2) skin-tone creams and the cosine of an angle. (And millions such).